Cidadania cultural - Cultural Citizenship by Miller, Toby

 58 
MATRIZes Ano 4 – nº 2 jan./jun. 2011 - São Paulo - Brasil – Toby Miller p. 57-74 
They correspond to the French Revolutionary cry ‘liberté, égalité, fraternité’ [liberty, 
equality, solidarity] and the Argentine left’s contemporary version ‘ser ciudadano, tener 
trabajo, y ser alfabetizado’ [citizenship, employment, and literacy] (Martín-Barbero 
2001: 9). The first category concerns political rights; the second, material interests; and 
the third, cultural representation (Rawls 1971: 61). 
 
Of course, citizenship has always been cultural. For instance, the Ottoman Empire 
offered non-Muslims ‘extensive cultural but few political rights’ (Parekh 2000: 7). The 
first constitutional guarantees of culture appear in Switzerland in 1874. Today, cultural 
provisions are standard in post-dictatorship charters, for example those of Mexico, South 
Africa, Brazil, Portugal, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Perú, and Spain. The meaning 
is generally a double one, blending artistry and ethnicity. Concerns with language, 
heritage, religion, and identity are responses to histories structured in dominance through 
cultural power and the postcolonial incorporation of the periphery into an international 
system of “free” labor, Malaysia, for instance, has been a predominantly Islamic area for 
centuries. Colonialism brought large numbers of South Asian and Chinese settlers, along 
with their religions. The postcolonial Constitution asserts a special status for ethnic 
Malays and Islam, while protecting the cultural rights of others. Muslims are the only 
people who can evangelize, and they have religious courts. Other varieties of superstition 
are tolerated, but may not proselytize, and are governed by secular rule (Miller, 2007a). 
 
In the Netherlands, Sudan, Yemen, Slovenia, Bahrain, and Portugal, citizenship rests on 
language skills. In Sweden and Sudan, it depends on leading ‘a respectable life’ and 
having ‘good moral character’ respectively. ‘Attachment’ to local culture is a criterion in 
Croatia, and knowledge of culture and history in Romania. Liberia requires that citizens 
‘preserve, foster, and maintain the positive Liberian culture,’ something it avows can 
only be done by ‘persons who are Negroes or of Negro descent.’ This racialization also 
applies in Sierra Leone, and Israel restricts citizenship to Jews plus Arabs who lived there 
prior to 1948 and their descendants. Partial racial and religious preferences also rule in 
Bahrain and Yemen. No wonder the British Government’s desire to impose an English-, 
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Welsh-, or Scottish Gaelic-speaking requirement on those seeking citizenship, announced 
in 2002, quickly drew fire from the people of color it was clearly designed to exclude, 
even as its defenders regarded it as a test of fitness for everyday life. Or that the 
Argentine state’s attempt to suppress non-Euro cultural formations by a variety of bizarre 
cultural technologies, from requiring all school pupils to cover their clothes with white 
dustcoats to prohibiting indigenous languages, has failed (Miller, 2007b). 
 
The model liberal citizen is a clear-headed, cool subject who knows when to set aside 
individual and sectarian preferences in search of the greater good. This sounds acultural 
and neutral; perhaps neutered. But historically, it has frequently corresponded, in both 
rhetorical and legal terms, to male, property-owning subjects protecting their interests 
from the population in general by requiring the public renunciation of other loyalties, an 
unquestioning embrace of national ideologies, and an apparent self-control over personal 
desire. This has led to profoundly cultural qualifications for a putatively culture-free 
zone—the United States government. Many philosophical liberals insist on a common 
language and nation as prerequisites for effective citizenship. But cultural differences 
bring into doubt what a ‘properly ordered life’ might mean in nations split by a migrant 
population’s languages, religions, and senses of self. As the political theorist Will 
Kymlicka says, it ‘is not that traditional human rights doctrines give us the wrong answer 
to these questions. It is rather that they often give no answer at all. The right to free 
speech does not tell us what an appropriate language policy is’ (1995: 5). Theodore 
Roosevelt’s insistence on a ‘swift assimilation of aliens’ via the ‘language and culture 
that has come down to us from the builders of the republic’ (quoted in Parekh 2000: 5) 
looks impractical, an ill-advised ideological furphy. These issues cannot be decided by 
force or fiat any more. The US is unable to sustain the cultural nationalism of a 
‘Monolingual Eden’ (Fuentes 2004: 79). 
 
When the US sought to prevent Chinese-Americans from obtaining passports a century 
ago, applicants were required to speak English, follow ‘American customs and dress,’ 
and demonstrate a knowledge of national geography and history. Today, to become a 
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citizen of the US other than by birth or blood, in addition to never having murdered 
anyone or had more pot than for immediate personal use, one must meet certain cultural 
requirements: 
• reside there 
• renounce allegiance to other states 
• ‘support the Constitution’ 
• know the country’s basic political history 
• ‘read, write, and speak words in ordinary usage in the English language’ 
• eschew polygamy 
• only gamble legally; and 
• neither consort with sex workers nor be repeatedly drunk in public 
To join the US military it is not necessary to be a citizen—obtaining citizenship is a potential 
benefit that attracts recruits—but there are several cultural requirements, such as no tattoos on 
the hand or face, no children out of wedlock, and no more than two within it (only recently did 
no convictions for domestic violence join the list). The Citizenship and Immigration Service 
utilizes these tests to determine ‘whether an applicant has established good moral character.’ Just 
as well I’m content with my Green Card. 
 
It is clear that just as globalization imposes and invites mobility, so cultural practices 
proliferate, split, and cross-pollinate. With little time for ‘processes of acculturation and 
assimilation’ (Castles and Davidson 2000: vii), a volatile mix of hybridity and 
primordiality emerges. It would be excessive to claim this as entirely new—the rebel 
pragmatist philosopher Randolph Bourne coined the phrase ‘Transnational America’ in 
1916 (Portes 2001: 182-83, 185), and blends of the modern and the traditional are 
constitutive of Latin America—but it does appear as though more and more transnational 
people and organizations now exist, weaving a blend of political, economic, and cultural 
links between places of origin and domicile. There is a crucial difference between the 
early-modern period in which contemporary citizenship was forged, when the West 
provided unwelcome, warlike migrants to the Third World, and the post-1950s period, 
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when the process went into reverse (largely minus belligerent intentions). Traditional 
views of naturalized citizenship have been thrown into confusion by late 20th-century 
immigration and multiculturalism. This is a matter of cultural belonging and material 
inequality. 
 
The ‘history of individual peoples, and indeed of whole continents such as ‘Europe’, is 
now being written in terms of a cultural formation defined by something outside, ‘the 
other’’ (Halliday 2001: 113). A global, postnational, or transnational citizenship emerges. 
Unlike the longstanding utopias of world citizenship, these terms are heuristic devices to 
describe actually-existing formations, beyond mere signs to fulfill wishes. And 
transnational cultural rights have emerged as a terrain of struggle. The framers of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights were riven over the topic, with the US and 
Canada virulently opposed to enshrining minority rights. Now a developing discourse of 
national and international human rights transcends borders, with the Commission on 
Human Rights recognizing the cultural in 2002. 
 
Most migrant workers around the world are not in the capitalist class or the salariat. They 
are “temporary” or “undocumented” employees, neither citizens nor immigrants. Again, 
culture is critical. These workers’ identities are quite separate from both their domicile 
and their source of sustenance, and they are frequently guaranteed equitable treatment not 
by sovereign-states, but through the supranational discourse of human rights and 
everyday customs and beliefs that supplement the legal obligations of conventional 
citizenship. The new conditions of citizenship do not necessarily articulate with 
democracy, because subjects of the international trade in labor frequently lack access to 
the power bases of native-born sons and daughters. In Argentina, for example, which has 
a migrant workforce from Bolivia and Peru to do menial jobs, leftists seek protection for 
“guest workers” by arguing that rights achieved in the aftermath of dictatorship should be 
extended to all residents, even as the state blames these guest workers for the 
recrudescence of embarrassing “premodern” diseases such as tuberculosis and measles. 
In the EU, the creation of “supranational citizenship” in 1992 problematized coupling 
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citizenship to national culture. But at the same time that this recognized a new 
international division of labor, equivalent moves limited the rights of guest workers from 
non-EU nations, who have long represented the vast majority of international labor 
within the Union. 
 
While both conservative critics and culturalist celebrants explain cultural citizenship as 
the outcome of social movements, it must also be understood as an adjustment to 
economic transformation; the right’s project of deregulation has played a role in creating 
and sustaining cultural citizenship. It is no surprise that the push for the Third World to 
constitute itself as a diverting heritage site and decadent playground for the West has seen 
the emergence of sex tourism and terrorism (Downey and Murdock 2003: 84). Globally, 
cultural citizenship is a response to an increasingly mobile middle-class culture-industry 
workforce. Domestically, cultural citizenship and media deregulation are coefficients of 
globalization, offering both raw material for foreign sales, and a means of local control. 
 
SEVEN FORMATIONS 
These complex politics form the backdrop to cultural citizenship. Seven key formations 
have theorized the phenomenon, each with strong links to the public sphere. 
 
First, cultural-studies sociologist Tony Bennett and colleagues in the Anglo-Australian 
cultural-policy studies movement focus on a guaranteed set of competences that 
governments should give citizens via artistic capital. Bennett favors uplift and 
dissemination that respect popular knowledges, borrowing from the liberal donnée that 
the most effective form of government rules via free individuals, who must be given the 
skills to live both autonomously and socially. His primary interlocutors are the cultural 
bureaucracies of Australia and the Council of Europe, and his admirers include 
progressives in search of influence beyond affective protest and critique (“Citizenship,” 
2000; Bennett, 1998 and 2001). Skeptical of ludic protest against the state and capital, 
Bennett nevertheless recognizes that social-movement identities must be acknowledged 
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by the modern liberal state. This line buys into the economic opportunities delivered by 
globalization and the need for local heritage to both counter and participate in it. 
 
Second, Chicano anthropologist Renato Rosaldo and colleagues in Californian, Texan, 
and New York Chican@, Tejan@, ethnic, and Latino@ studies seek rights for US 
minorities, claimed at the level of the vernacular or the everyday, in order to ‘establish a 
distinct social space’ through a combination of self-incorporation into the US, and the 
maintenance and development of a separate heritage and identity (Flores and Benmayor 
1997b: 1-2). Their primary interlocutors are Chican@ and Latin@ social movements, 
and their admirers include the Fresno Bee, while many of the ideas were promoted in the 
New York Times as part of debates about multiculturalism in universities (Rosaldo, 1997; 
Flores and Benmayor, 1997a; Rodriguez and Gonzales, 1995; “A Campus Forum,” 
1990). Rosaldo sees cultural citizenship as a ‘deliberate oxymoron’ that bridges 
difference and sameness in calling for economic and political equality, on the joint 
grounds of maintaining identity and exercising ‘full membership’ in the wider 
community (1994: 402). He claims that the difficulty with encouraging minority groups 
in the US to vote, and the low levels of naturalization for non-Asian minority 
immigrants (in the 1990s, 57.6% of Asian immigrants became US citizens, versus 32.2% 
of Latino/as [Aleinikoff 2000: 130]) can be addressed by promoting multiple affinities, 
to “former” languages, places, or norms, and to adopted countries. This kind of thinking 
is enshrined in the Indian Constitution, which enforces a common criminal code, but 
civil law acknowledges minority cultures, a legacy from thousands of years during 
which the Dharmashastra governed via collective identities rather than individual 
entitlements. It also informs UNESCO’s Institute for Education, which emphasizes 
collective as much as individual human rights, and regards cultural citizenship as a 
development from, and antidote to, assimilationist ideals (1999). 
 
Third, Canadian-based political theorist Kymlicka and a number of slightly heterodox 
Anglo-American liberal and communitarian colleagues seek a rapprochement between 
majority white settlement, ‘immigrant multiculturalism’ (newer voluntary migrants, who 
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deserve few cultural rights) and ‘minority nationalism’ (First Peoples, the dispossessed, 
and the enslaved, who deserve many) via the notion of culture as an aid to individual 
autonomy through engagement with collective as well as individual histories. The 
position is in keeping with Canada’s backdrop as the first commonwealth country to 
establish its own citizenship system, and an official practitioner of multiculturalism 
since 1971. Kymlicka’s admirers include the Wall Street Journal, the UN Development 
Programme, where he served as principal consultant for its 2004 venture into culture, 
and the UN’s chief expert on indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, who indexed 
this impact in his keynote address at the 2003 Congreso Internacional de Americanistas 
on moving from the status of indigeneity to cultural citizenship (Kymlicka, 1995 and 
2000; Jenson and Papillon, 2001; Zachary, 2000; United Nations Development 
Programme, 2004; “Chile-Indigenas,” 2003). 
 
Other interlocutors include states dealing with ethnic minorities. When the Soviet Union 
broke up into close to twenty countries, Moscow was content to see 25 million ethnic 
Russians remain in what it refers to as ‘the near abroad’ (Rich, 2003). Its former 
republics had two choices in dealing with these sizeable and often wealthy minorities: 
propound a retributive cultural nationalism that marginalized the Russian language and 
set religious, racial, and linguistic criteria for citizenship (which Estonia and Latvia did, 
relegating Russians from ‘setting the cultural agenda of the public sphere’ to ‘the 
private/communal’ one); or adopt a pragmatic civic policy that offered entitlements 
based on territory, fealty, and labor (as was done in Ukraine and Kazakhstan). The 
former then had to defuse the resultant conflicts via Russian-language schools and 
cultural groups—courtesy of a Kymlicka consultancy. At the same time, they changed 
their cultural image, abjuring the nomenclature ‘Baltic’ and ‘post-Soviet’ in favor of 
‘Scandinavian’ and ‘pre-European Union.’ Needless to say, they are “encouraged” to 
incorporate Russian minorities by the prospect of EU membership and money via 
adherence to the European Convention on Nationality. 
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Where Rosaldo et al. seek to transform citizenship in the interests of those marginalized 
by the majority, Bennett et al. and Kymlicka et al. utilize it for a general purpose that 
takes account of minorities. For Rosaldo, US culture is distinguished by Latin@ 
disenfranchisement. Cultural difference substantively trumps formal universalism, and it 
is not good enough to follow the standard arms-length approach of liberal philosophy, 
whereby state institutions adopt a neutral stance on cultural maintenance. Rosaldo is 
critical of neoliberalism and liberal philosophy for their myths of the acultural sovereign 
individual, which in fact assume a shared language and culture as the basis of 
government. For liberal philosophy’s brand of ‘civic nationalism’ involves an allegiance 
not merely to the state, but to images of nationhood that stretch across public and private 
realms (Runnymede Commission 2000: 19, 36). Kymlicka thinks along similar lines, but 
endorses liberalism, provided that states protect minorities—as a matter of justice and 
self-interest. For Bennett, culture is a set of tools for living that derive their value from 
the achievement of specific purposes, rather than being expressive ends in themselves. 
He sees government as a project of constituting, not drawing upon, the liberal individual, 
and is agnostic about its sovereign-individual claims. Bennett and Kymlicka’s 
cosmopolitan approaches remain rooted, for pragmatic reasons, in the nation, because it 
is assumed to provide a boundary of fealty that can appeal to the better sentiments of its 
inhabitants. 
 
The fourth theoretical formation, vocalized by the philosopher Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 
is a neoliberal capture of the first three positions. On this view, cultural maintenance and 
development should be by-products of universal access to education, a ‘primary condition 
of free and equal citizen participation in public life.’ Rorty opposes public funding to 
sustain familial or religious cultural norms, calling instead for a curriculum that will 
generate flexible cosmopolitans who learn about their country and its “global neighbors” 
(1995: 162, 164). Rorty’s argument is a culturalist restatement of human-capital nostra 
about individuals maximizing their utility through investment in skills, with links to 
Bennett’s call for citizens to learn a set of cultural competences. She rejects cross-cultural 
awareness as a necessary component of good citizenship and justice, but endorses it as 
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good business sense. This is in line with the UN Development Programme, which argues 
that ‘culturally diverse societies’ are necessary preliminaries to the eradication of 
poverty, rather than a nice afterglow (2004: v). Clearly, Rorty’s instrumental approach 
may lead to cultural erasure, for all its cosmopolitanism. 
 
All these logics are engaged by the fifth key formation of cultural citizenship, the UK 
Runnymede Trust Commission’s Report on The Future of a Multi-Ethnic Britain (2000). 
Its Chair was the political theorist and future member of the House of Lords Bhikhu 
Parekh, and its secondary public face in the UK media came from his fellow 
Commissioner, Stuart Hall. The Commission examined racism within national 
institutions of culture, education, policing, and welfare. Populist reactions to their work 
give us a sense of how deep cultural conflicts run within citizenship: ‘“Sub-Marxist 
gibberish”; “out-of-touch nonsense”; “an insult to our history and intelligence”’ 
(“‘British’ is Already,” 2000). The authors were accused of ‘a lack of loyalty and 
affection for Britain’ (Parekh, 2001). The Daily Mail reacted by producing a ‘list of ten 
dead white heroes of the last millennium’ (Seaford 2001: 108). William Hague, then the 
leader of the Conservative Party, derided the Report as an index of the left’s ‘tyranny of 
political correctness and … assault on British culture and history’ (2000: 28), while The 
Scotsman referred to it as ‘a grotesque libel against the people of this land and a 
venomous blueprint for the destruction of our country’ (Warner, 2000). Jack Straw, then 
the Home Secretary and later a notorious warmonger in Afghanistan and Iraq, rejected 
the linkage of Britishness to white racism. This indicates how much can be at stake in 
these debates, beyond Bennett’s technical specifications of cultural-policy interventions, 
Rosaldo’s feel-good vernacular multiculturalism, Kymlicka’s attempt to “get along” in 
newly free, newly chauvinistic post-socialist environments, or Rorty’s faith in an 
inclusive curriculum animated by enlightened self-interest. 
 
That becomes clearer still in the sixth formation, which addresses the limits of 
neoliberalism. Amy Chua, a lawyer operating from a comparative ethnic-studies 
perspective—and publishing with a US trade house, rather than an academic press—
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investigates in a global frame the intersection of neoliberalism, ethnic-minority economic 
oligarchies, and democracy: what happens when wealthy minorities confront popular 
backlashes against their economic power via majoritarian rejection of cultural difference. 
While the economy enriches ‘the market-dominant minority, democratization increases 
the political voice and power of the frustrated majority’ (2003: 124). As Chua puts it, 
provocatively and with the clear regret of a fan of both capitalism and democracy, this is 
about the conundrum ‘that turns free market democracy into an engine of ethnic 
conflagration’ (2003: 6). Her work details the way that indigenous majorities protest their 
weakness. Class, corruption, and race jumble together, as ‘market-dominant minorities, 
along with their foreign-investor partners, invariably come to control the crown jewels of 
the economy … oil in Russia and Venezuela, diamonds in South Africa, silver and tin in 
Bolivia, jade, teak, and rubies in Burma’ (2003: 10). Free markets concentrate wealth 
disproportionately, while democracies concentrate politics proportionately. Political 
enfranchisement and its economic opposite are mediated through cultural difference, with 
the outcome revolutionary. The horrors of Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia in the 
1990s illustrate what happens when ethnonationalist populism draws on majority 
resentment to quash minority economic power, based on cultural difference (2003: 11-13, 
16-17). 
 
The seventh, and most powerful, formation derives from the work of Middle Eastern 
historian and professional anti-Palestinian Bernard Lewis and Cold-War political 
scientist, Vietnam-War architect, and English-only advocate Samuel Huntington. In the 
post-Soviet 1990s, these two men turned to culture for geopolitical explanations. Lewis 
(1990) coined the expression ‘clash of civilizations’ to capture the difference, as he saw 
it, between the separation of church and state that had generated the successes of the US, 
versus their intercalculation in Islamic nations, which had produced those countries’ 
subordinate status. Forget Yanqui support of authoritarian anti-democrats and coups that 
furthered oil exploitation—Islamic ressentiment is all about the US insisting that Caesar 
get his due, and god his. Huntington (1993) appropriated the ‘clash of civilizations’ to 
argue that future world-historical conflicts would not be ‘primarily ideological or 
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primarily economic’ but ‘cultural’ (22). This dematerializes politics—and most 
specifically, excuses the policies and programs of the United States government and 
corporations as only broadly relevant to the loathing of that nation elsewhere. 
 
The “clash twins’” grotesque generalizations have gained immense attention over the past 
decade, notably since September 11 2001. In the United States, Huntington’s Olympian 
grandiosity was lapped up by the bourgeois media, ever-ready to embrace ‘a cartoon-like 
world where Popeye and Bluto bash each other’ (Said, 2001). Journalists promote the 
notion of an apocalyptic struggle between good and evil as the bifurcation of the US and 
Islam, plundering Lewis and Huntington on the differences between Western and Islamic 
culture. Across the daily press and weekly and monthly magazines of ruling opinion, 
extra-state violence is attributed to Islam in opposition to freedom and technology, never 
as the act of subordinated groups against dominant ones. The New York Times and 
Newsweek gave Huntington room to account for what had happened in terms of his 
“thesis,” while others took up the logic as a call for empire, from the supposed New Left 
(Dissent magazine and other progressives who share this common Yanqui blind spot on 
the region) through to leading communitarians and the neoliberal Economist. After the 
attacks, Arab leaders met to discuss the impact of the Lewis-Huntington conceit, and 
Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi invoked it. As the US occupation of Iraq entered 
its third year, military commanders and senior non-commissioned officers were required 
to read the book (along with VS Naipaul and Islam for Dummies) (Rusciano, 2003; Said, 
2001; Schmitt, 2005). 
 
Not everyone was so taken with these ideas. UNESCO’s Director General prefaced the 
Organization’s worthy Declaration on Cultural Diversity with a specific rebuttal 
(Matsuura, 2001) and El País’ cartoonist Máximo traumatically constructed a dialog 
alongside the tumbling Towers: ‘Choque de ideas, de culturas, de civilizaciones’ [Clash 
of ideas, of cultures, of civilizations] drew the reply ‘choques de desesperados contra 
instalados’ [the clash of the desperate against the establishment] (quoted in García 
Canclini 2002: 16]. Israel’s Ha-aretz regarded the Lewis-Huntington thesis’ ‘hegemonic 
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hold’ as ‘a major triumph’ for Al Qaeda, and the Arab News aptly typified it as 
‘Armageddon dressed up as social science’ (quoted in Rusciano 2003: 175). Study after 
study has disproven Lewis and Huntington’s wild assertions about growing ethnic 
struggle since the Cold War, and a unitary Islamic culture opposed to a unitary “West.” 
Such claims fatally neglect conflicts over money, property, water, and politics (Fox, 
2002; Norris and Inglehart 2003: 203; United Nations Development Programme, 2004). 
The clash-of-civilizations thesis does not work if you apply it to Iran supporting Russia 
against Chechen rebels and India against Pakistan, or the US attitude to the Iran-Iraq 
War. But why bother with world-historical details when you are offered ‘international 
relations with politics taken out’ (Abrahamian 2003: 535). 
 
Huntington’s later critiques of hispano hablantes in the US (2004) led to support from the 
Center for Immigration Studies and a battery of influential pop-policy intellectuals whose 
scholarship lay long behind them, if it ever amounted to much. The chorines include Cold 
Warrior Zbigniew Brzezinski, old-school area-studies founder Lucian Pye, Nixon and 
Reagan servant and advocate of the ‘broken-windows’ theory in support of severe 
punishments for minor wrongdoings James Q Wilson, reactionary Newsweek journalist 
Fareed Zakaria, and the agile cultural citizens of <vdare.com>, self-appointed keepers of 
the flame of a lost tribe of Yanqui whiteness. The awkward fact that just 21% of third-
generation Latin@s identify with their countries of origin, that most US-born Latin@s 
have much more conservative views on immigration than recent arrivals, and that third-
generation Latin@s are predominantly monolingual English-speakers must be left out for 
this nonsense to flourish—not to mention the fact that Huntington’s beloved early 
settlers, whose ethos is supposedly central to the US, were as wrapped up in burning 
witches, haranguing adulteresses, and wearing foppish clothing and wigs as anything else 
(Alba, 2004; Lomnitz, 2005). The argument is wrong morally, pragmatically, and 
empirically. But it is cultural. 
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CONCLUSION 
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The matrix above summarizes these positions. Both the arid lands of Bennett and the 
humidispheres of Rosaldo, Kymlicka, Parekh, and Chua illustrate the improbability of 
wiping from history the differences between indigenes, dominant settlers, and minority 
migrants—yet Rorty contrives a human-capital merger of all the above, and Lewis and 
Huntington offer an ideological justification for hollowing out material history and 
accounting for Western hegemony in cultural terms. It seems that Bennett’s competences, 
Rosaldo’s resistances, and Kymlicka, Parekh, and Chua’s relativisms can be 
accommodated (albeit with their rhetorics softened at some points and hardened at others) 
in a neoliberal worldview whose limits are set via the hyper-culturalism and closet 
nationalism of the ‘clash’ theorists. All for the cultural in the most cultural of all possible 
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worlds, with the capstone being an efficient and effective workforce, whose 
cosmopolitanism is brokered on a respect for difference that goes guarantor of individual 
advantage in a globally competitive labor market. 
 
Each of these approaches is dealing with heavily practical yet highly emotional, 
profoundly populist yet avowedly technical forms of thought. As such, they inevitably 
rub up against contradictions. Bennett must deal with the incommensurability of 
neoliberal and statist prescriptions. Rosaldo must make peace with the fact that 
government is frequently the court of appeal for vernacular protest. Kymlicka and Parekh 
must come to terms with the economic limits to liberal philosophy. Rorty must engage 
the obstinate collectivism and hybridity of culture, and the fact that neoliberalism is no 
more metacultural than any other form of thought. Chua must acknowledge the 
constitutive inequality and brutality of capitalism. Lewis and Huntington must explain the 
reality of US Middle Eastern policy, and more precise histories than their grandiosities 
will allow. 
 
For reactionaries, cultural citizenship signifies a loss of national and spiritual unity, as 
sectarianism and secularism overwhelm patriotism and superstition. For the left, for 
cultural studies, cultural citizenship concerns the maintenance, development, and 
exchange of cultural lineage—a celebration of difference that is also a critique of the 
status quo. For the neoliberal right, it offers a new set of market and ecclesiastical niches 
and sites of self-governance. My concern is that the cultural left got what we wanted—
culture at the center of politics and socio-political analysis. But it wasn’t Queer Nation 
and Stuart Hall. It was consumerism and Samuel Huntington. We need to rearticulate 
culture to the economy and capital ‘p’ politics, not a misleading, anti-materialist sphere 
of ideation. 
 
Doctrines of cultural citizenship can work towards a more equitable world if they reject 
the technicism, utopianism, liberalism, nationalism, and neoliberalism of business-as-
usual cultural citizenship, and recognize their reliance on deregulatory projects as much 
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as leftist social movements. In answer to the theoreticism and technocracy of 
neoliberalism, we can point to participatory/popular budgeting systems undertaken by 
leftist regional and urban governments in Kerala, Mexico City, and Porto Alegre over the 
past fifteen years, and Brazil’s sindicato cidadão [citizens’ trade union]. We can form 
strategic alliances with opponents of neoliberalism from within, such as George Soros, 
who made his fortune on the financial markets, but now sees that ‘the untrammeled 
intensification of laissez-faire capitalism and the spread of market values into all areas of 
life is endangering our open and democratic society’ (1997). 
 
In his “Ten Dispatches About Place” from 2005, the noted cultural critic John Berger 
responds to the query ‘Are you still a Marxist?’ After tracking through the unparalleled 
‘devastation caused by the pursuit of profit,’ he concludes that ‘Yes, I’m still among 
other things a Marxist.’ Those ‘other things’ are terribly important, registering crucial 
forms of life that operate with varying degrees of autonomy from the economy. But they 
can only be engaged alongside the equally crucial aspects addresseped here. So a quick 
question: are you still a culturalist? 
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